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Article 4

The King Can Do No Wrong, But Will He Do Right
By Our School Children?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Kathy Dockweiler needed help. She was losing weight and
had an irrational fear of eating. Kathy sought help from the local
health services company, a tax-supported government agency. 1
During her therapy she was the victim of several sexual advances
by her staff psychologist which culminated in a sexual assault with
forced intercourse. 2 In 1986 Kathy brought a lawsuit against the
health care facility and the county for "professional malpractice,
violation of [her] civil rights, negligent maintenance of premises,
negligent supervision, and violation of the Mental Health Code."3
Although Kathy could clearly bring a personal action
against the staff psychologist, her complaint against the health
care facility and Allegan County was dismissed. Such a frustrating
outcome is common for many who bring lawsuits against state
governments or municipal corporations and find that such entities
are immune from suit. Regarding the Dockweiler case, Nickie
McWhirter, in her article entitled Law Has Some Lousy Loopholes,
observed:
The suit was dismissed ... not for lack of proof or plaintiff's
credibility, but because it is legally assumed the king can do no
wrong. Worse than unfair Government is king. Its agencies and
employees in pursuit of their duties are legally immune from the
constraints that bind ordinary citizens or businesses, [and] the
decent behaviors expected of other members of society.
Among the things they can get away with, evidently, is
sexual harassment and what sounds to me like rape.
There are a few exceptions to this governmental
immunity business. I'm told by lawyers if a government building
falls on your head, you can sue. If a city bus runs you down, you
can sue. If your car is eaten by an unmarked chuck hole the size
of Cleveland, you can sue.

1. Because this agency was supported by tax dollars and sponsored by the
government, it is deemed a quasi municipal corporation covered by governmental
immunity.
2. Dockweiler v. Wentzell, 425 N.W.2d 468,469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
3. Id.
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If you are emotionally ill, seek help from a governmental
agency offering services for the emotionally ill and are then
subjected to sexual harassment and unwanted sexual intercourse,
however, you can't sue - although you could sue a private clinic
and therapist .... 4

Although Kathy Dockweiler was not a student, and her
health care facility was not a public school, her case is closely
analogous to that of children who are injured while at school. The
parents of these children experience similiar frustration. These
parents seek compensation from the school to help cover medical
bills as well as compensation for the pain and suffering of their
children, only to find that school boards of directors, maintenance
staffs, and teachers are covered by a heavy blanket of
governmental immunity. 5
In 1977 the Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Whitney v.
City ofWorcester, heard the story ofKris Whitney, who was struck
at school just above the right eye by a door and lost his vision. 6
Kris' father sued the city. "He charged the school with negligence
in ignoring a janitor's report that the door had a defective closing
mechanism and that the staff was negligent for not notifying him
about the accident immediately." 7
The Massachusetts Supreme Court empathized with
frustrated victims who faced the governmental immunity defense
in tort actions. In its opinion the court referred to a decision it
handed down in 1973 which dealt with the issue of governmental
immunity:
On previous occasions we have voiced our conclusion that the

4. Nickie McWhirter, Law Has Some Lousy Loopholes, Detroit Free Press, July
31, 1988, at 1L.
5. See, e.g., Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1213 (Mass. 1977)
(Massachusetts Supreme Court explaining that injured school child should be able to
bring his action but that the legislature must change the governmental immtmity law
not the court); Mcintosh v. Becker, 314 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)(holding
that a student who was subject to slander and assault by a teacher was barred from
bringing suit by governmental immunity statute); Swieter v. Forest Hills Pub. Sch.,
319 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)(student who was struck in eye by
chalkboard eraser thrown by another student was barred from bringing his action
against the school by the governmental immtmity statute despite the fact there was
no supervision in the room at the time of the accident); Ledfors v. Emery County Sch.
Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993)(student beaten up by fellow pupils was barred
from bringing negligence action against the school district and principal, despite the
fact he had told them of previous abuse by the same students and asked for
protection).
6. 366 N.E.2d at 1210.
7. Jean Caldwell, I Wonder Why I Cannot See "Courts and Cannots" Dashing
the Hopes of a Blind Teen-ager, Boston Globe, July 4, 1983.
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governmental immunity doctrine and the convoluted scheme of
rules and exceptions which have developed over the years are
unjust and indefensible as a matter of logic and sound public
policy. However, on those occasions we further concluded that
comprehensive legislative action was preferable to judicial
abrogation followed by an attenuated process of defining the
limits of governmental liability through case by case
adjudication. 8
In Whitney, the court finally gave the legislature a bold
ultimatum to lift governmental immunity, in some cases even
retroactively:
[W]e state our intention to abrogate the doctrine of municipal
immunity in the first appropriate case decided by this court after
the conclusion of the next (1978) session of the Legislature,
provided that the Legislature at that time has not itself acted
definitively as to the doctrine. Thereafter, when appropriate
cases concerning State and county immunity are presented, it is
our intention to take similar action to abrogate immunity. 9
The Massachusetts legislature, with this ultimatum hanging over
its head, changed the law. Sadly, for the Whitneys, the legislature
made the action retroactive to August 16, 1977, one day too late to
apply to their claim. 10
This paper examines the background of the government or
sovereign immunity doctrine, the public policy behind it, and how
this doctrine has been applied to tort liability suits brought by
students against school districts, boards and teachers.
Furthermore, this paper considers the general effect of the
governmental immunity doctrine on school administrators and
teachers.

8. Whitney, 366 N.E.2d at 1211 (citing Morash & Sons v. Commonwealth, 296
N.E.2d 461 (Mass. 1973)).
9. ld. at 1212.
10. Caldwell, supra note 8.
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HISTORY OF GoVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

Governmental Immunity Generally

"An immunity is a freedom from suit or liability." 11 The
government has enjoyed such immunity over time on both the
national and state levels. The idea originated in the old English
law notion that "the King can do no wrong." 12 The rational behind
the doctrine was that an individual may not sue the authority who
granted the right to sue in the first place. 13
In 1946, however, the national government, through the
Federal Tort Claims Act, gave its consent to be sued in tort. 14
Although this was a big step in reforming the law on governmental
immunity, there were still several restrictions on the types of tort
claims that could be brought and under what circumstances. 15
Similarly, at the state level, the immunity from tort liability
offered complete protection until recently, when many states began
adopting statutes which give consent to liability. However, each
state, like the national government, has established various
restrictions on the types of suits that can be brought. 16 They can
be grouped in three different categories:
First, about seven or eight states, though technically retaining
immunity from suit in the law courts, have established
administrative agencies to hear and determine claims against the
state ....
Second, a group of nine states have waived the tort
immunity in some limited class of cases, typically cases in which
the state or its agency has procured liability insurance that will
pay any judgment, or cases involving the use of motor vehicles or
tangible property. One or two states have injected the distinction
much followed in the law of municipal immunity so as to retain
the immunity for 'governmental' activities, but to abolish it for
'proprietary' or commercial activities of the state....
Third, about 30 states, the largest single group, have
abrogated the immunity in a substantial or general way.... On

11. W. PAGE KEETON et. al., PROSSERANDKEETONONTHELAWOFTORTS § 131
at 1032 (5th ed. 1984).
12. Id., (citing Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1
(1926); Parker, The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 Vand.
L. Rev. 167 (1952)).
13. Id. at 1033.
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1988).
15. KEETON, supra note 11 at 1038-39.
16. Id. at 1044.
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the whole ... the liability of ... this group is approximately as
broad as, or broader than, the liability of the federal government
under the tort claims act. 17

The governmental immunity enjoyed by federal and state governments has also been applied to government municipalities; hence,
school districts and school administrators fall under it's protection.
B.

Governmental Immunity in School Systems

The only difference for schools is that in determining
whether the immunity applies, the court must establish whether
there was harm while the entity was acting in a proprietary or a
governmental role. If harm occurred to another while the
governmental entity was acting in a proprietary or money-making
role, then liability may stand against the municipality. If,
however, the harm occurred while the municipality was
perpetuating a governmental function, the municipality is covered
by governmental immunity. 18
The blanket of governmental immunity can be broad or
narrow depending on how a state defines governmental function.
For example, the State of Utah falls under category three in the
above breakdown, yet the state retains substantial coverage under
governmental immunity because of its broad statutory definition.
Governmental function, as defined in the Utah Code Annotated,
includes any act or failure to act by a governmental entity, whether
it be a proprietary or governmental function. 19
More specifically, the Utah Code enforces waiver of
governmental immunity for certain acts such as negligent acts of
a government employee but then also offers exceptions to those
waivers. 20 It is only in this very narrow area ofthe analysis that
the "proprietary versus governmental" function distinction takes
place, and even then, the question is whether the employee
performed or failed to perform a "discretionary function" and
whether or not that discretion was abused. 21
The Utah Supreme Court used a three part test in making
the "discretionary function" determination. 1) Was the activity the
entity performed a governmental function and therefore
immunized from suit by the general grant of immunity contained
in section 63-30-3(1)? 2) If the activity was a governmental

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.at1045.

!d. at 1053.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989).
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1989).
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function, has some other section of the Act waived that blanket
immunity? 3) If the blanket immunity has been waived, does the
Act also contain an exception to that waiver which results in a
retention of immunity against the particular claim asserted in this
case?22
The majority of states generally consider the running of a
school to be a governmental function. Even the administration of
school athletics has been deemed a governmental function. 23 There
have been both economic and historic reasons given for allowing
governmental immunity to apply to schools.
The public policy rationales for abrogation of governmental
immunity are compelling:
(1) the absence of funds for discharge of a judgment and (2) the
theory that it is preferable that an individual should sustain an
injury than the public suffer an inconvenience. As to the lack of
funds as a basis for immunity, the state legislature may grant
boards of education the authority to purchase liability insurance
. . . . As to the preference for the public interest over private
interests, the justification is deemed archaic, since personal
injuries from the negligence of those entrusted with the care of
school children is not a risk the children should, as a matter of
public policy, be required to bear in return for the benefit of a
public education. 24
It is important to understand that the doctrine has been applied to

schools to protect school teachers, administrators and school
boards from excesive litigation.
III. WHAT EFFECT DOES GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY HAVE ON
THE WAY SCHOOL TEACHERS PROTECT THEIR CHILDREN IN
REACTION TO VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS?

A.

Duties of Educators to Protect School Children

The law has always placed a duty on teachers and
administrators to protect the children in their care. Historically,
under the common law there was a duty of care owed to students
while they were under school administration. The extent of the
duty was determined by the standard of care deemed necessary by
the common law. In order to understand the duty owed to

22. Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993).
23. Id., see also Grames v. King, 332 N.W.2d 615 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)(stating
that school districts, in planning and carrying out extracurricular girls' basketball
program, were engaged in governmental function and thus immune from snit).
24. 57 AM. JUR. 20 Municipal § 52 (1985).
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students by teachers at school it is important to understand the
common law concept of in loco parentis (in place of the parents).
"Under the in loco parentis doctrine, teachers and school
administrators [were] liable for their omission or failure to act
when a student [was] in danger within the school setting." 25 This
doctrine was both a benefit and a burden for teachers and
administrators. It allowed them the same right to punish as
parents had, but, held them to the same standard of care as a
conscientious parent. 26
The current standard of care is discussed in terms of
"reasonableness" or the "reasonable person" standard. If a student
bringing an action against a teacher or administrator can prove 1)
that a "reasonable" standard of care was not met, and 2) that
failure to meet that standard caused him injury, and 3) the extent
of such injury, then the teacher or administrator would be held
liable to pay the damages incurred, if governmental immunity did
not apply.
The reasonableness standard did not fully discard the
doctrine of in loco parentis but rather loosened the standard
slightly. Where the in loco parentis standard put the teacher "in
place of the parent," the reasonablness standard only requires
"exercising reasonable and prudent care, ordinary care and that
care which a person of ordinary prudence charged with the duties
involved would exercise under the same circumstances." 27
Additionally, the duty of reasonableness is limited to foreasable
events. Thus, when injury occurs suddenly, or without warning,
there is generally no obligation. 28
In light of this standard of care and the governmental
immunity doctrine discussed above, a conflicting system of laws
has been created. On the one hand, teachers and administrators
have a duty to exercise reasonable care in protecting the children
in their schools. On the other hand, governmental immunity often
provides blanket immunity for the negligence of teachers and
administrators, essentially nullifying the reasonableness standard.
B.

Courts Have Often Held Teachers and Administrators
Blameless for Violent Occurrences in Schools

In January of 1989, Richard Ledfors (Richie) informed his
school principal that two of his fellow students had assaulted him
25. Donald L. Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth
Amendment, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 817,823 (1992).
26. Eugene T. Connors, Educational Tort Liability and Malpractice, 23 (1981).
27. 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, ETC., Tort Liability § 541 (1985).
28. ld. at § 545.
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several times. The principal assured Richie that he would take
care of the problem, yet nothing was done. 29 In February, while
Richie was attending his gym class, the coach left to check on some
other students in another gym. The students, who had been
roaming the halls, passed the gym and saw Richie inside. While
Richie's friends unsuccessfuly searched for a teacher or school
employee to intervene, Richie was viciously beaten. 30 He was
taken by ambulance to the hospital, where he remained for several
days, receiving care for severe injuries to his head, abdomen and
back. 31
The Ledforses sued the two boys for battery. They also
named the physical education teacher, the school district, and the
principal in the suit and alleged negligence in failing to supervise
the gym class and for allowing the two students to roam the halls
unsupervised. 32 However, the trial court granted the school
teacher, the school district and the principal summary judgment,
as the court deemed these parties covered under Utah's
governmental immunity statute. 33
On appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, the Ledforses made
three basic arguments challenging the lower court's interlocutory
order:
[F]irst, that operation of a school is not a governmental function;
second, that section 63-30-lO(l)(b) should not immunize the
government from suit for injuries arising out of a battery
committed by a person who is not a government employee; and
third, that their cause of action arises not from the battery, but
from the government's breach of its duty to supervise and protect
minor students in public schools. 34

The Utah Supreme Court addressed each of these issues. As to the
first it defined "governmental function" as:
any act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking of a
governmental entity whether or not the act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking is characterized as
governmental, proprietary, a core governmental function, unique
to government, undertaken in a dual capacity, essential to or not
essential to a government or governmental function, or could be
performed by private enterprise or private persons. 35

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1162.
ld. at 1163.
ld.

Id.
ld.
ld.

Id. at 1165.
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Since the court held that the running of a school was a
governmental function, they concluded that governmental
immunity should apply to general actions of the school. The court
then looked at other statutes to see if any exception waived the
immunity afforded the school in this case. Utah Code "waives
immunity for injuries caused by a negligent act or omission of a
governmental employee."36 However, the court found an exception
to that waiver. Section 63-30-lO(l)(b) provides "that immunity is
waived 'except if the injury arises out of ... assault, battery, false
imprisonment, or false arrest."' 37
The second argument put forth by the Ledforses-that
governmental immunity should not stand where it was not a
government official who actually committed the battery-failed to
persuade the court.
"Our statute clearly states that the
employment status of the assailant is irrelevant to the question of
immunity."38
The final arguement-that the cause of action arose not
from the battery itself, but from the negligent supervision of school
teachers-was also discmmted by the court. The court stated that
"the Ledforses ignore the fact that the structure of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, especially section 63-30-10, focuses
on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the
theory ofliability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence
alleged." 39 This was simply a bootstraping arguement as "school
supervision" is as much a "conduct or situation" as it is a "theory
of liability."
Although this opinion was not favorable for the Ledforses,
it does illustrate a forward step for student protection and the
enforcement of school administrators and teachers duty of
reasonable care. The conclusion of the Ledfors opinion is
significant because it demonstrates that the Utah Supreme Court
felt the same frustration in formulating this decision as the
Massachusetts Supreme Court felt when it handed down the
Whitney decision. As discussed above, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court moved from an admonition to an ultimatum to the
legislature that the law be changed regarding the extensive
governmental immunity.
The Utah Supreme Court similiarly offered its apology to
the Ledforses and asked the legislature to correct this injustice by

36.
37.
38.
39.

UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63-30-10(1) (1989).
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 63-30-10(1)(b) (1989).
Ledfors, 849 P.2d at 1166.
ld. at 1166.
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changing the governmental immunity law:
It is unfortunate that any parent who is required by state law to
send his or her child to school lacks a civil remedy against
negligent school personnel who fail to assure the child's safety at
school. Nevertheless, the legislature has spoken with clarity on
the question of immunity, and we are constrained by the plain
language of the Act and our prior case law on this point.
However, as we stated in O'Neal v. Division of Family Services,
"Certainly, the legislature is not so constrained as we." 821 P.2d
1139, 1145 (Utah 1991). It is entirely within the legislature's
power to permit all plaintiffs to whom the government owes a
duty of care based on a special relationship to bring suit for
injuries arising out of a breach of that duty. Or the legislature
could tailor the waiver of immunity more narrowly; the state
could permit suit by or on behalf of public school children injured
as a result of such a breach of duty. Its power to craft waivers of
immunity is far superior to ours. 40

Perhaps the language of this Utah opnion could have been
stronger, but the point was made. Other states may have not have
taken such a stand, and school administrators and teachers remain
somewhat unbounded by the duty of care.
Some states have a different way of determining
"governmental function" and whether or not governmental
immunity applies. In Oregon, for example, ifthe school board or
school administrators are acting in a discretionary function or
making policy choices, they are immune from suit. If, however,
they fulfil a functional role, and in so doing, fail to take reasonable
actions, the negligent administrator or teacher may be liable. 41
This theory oflaw was expressed in the Mosley v. Portland
School District case, a negligence action brought by a female
student who was stabbed during a knife fight with another girl at
school. The plaintiff alleged that the school district
was negligent in: (1) failing to exercise proper supervision of
students; (2) failing to provide proper security and sufficient
security personnel for protection of students when defendant
knew that students carried weapons at the school; (3) failing to
prevent weapons from being carried into the school building; and
(4) failing to stop the attack before the knife was used. 42

The Oregon court held that, as to allegations one, two, and
three, the school district and the school principal were acting in a
40. ld. at 1167.
41. Mosley v. Portland Sch. Dist., 843 P.2d 415 (Or. 1992).
42. ld. at 416.
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discretionary function in determining what type of security to use
and how many security personnel should be employed at the school
to protect the students. Because the school district and the
principal were taking discretionary measures, they were protected
under doctrine of governmental immunity. As to the fourth
allegation, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to
suggest that the principal actually knew that the fight was
occurring or consequently that he could have stopped it.

C.

The "Wait and See" Approach

The two cases discussed above illustrate how the doctrine
of governmental immunity may be applied to create injustice. It
is likely that in both the Ledfors and Mosley cases the parents
suffered financial hardship in paying for the medical bills of their
children. It is also likely that the children harmed in those cases
had a difficult time overcoming the trauma and pain that
accompanied their injuries. It is unfair that the parents and the
victims may not be compensated for the harm done to them. In
such situations, the governmental immunity doctrine offers a
possible safe haven for school teachers and administrators
regardless of their negligence in allowing harm to come to school
children who are placed in their care daily.
What effect will this doctrine have on the protection of our
school children in the future? Will administrators and teachers
take a "wait and see" approach to problems of violence in their
schools because they know they will often be covered by tort
immunity? Or will they actively seek to protect our children?
VII.

CONCLUSION

This paper does not intend to answer those questions. Nor
does this paper intend to suggest that all school administrators
and teachers are negligent. However, this paper does illustrate
that the law has created an out; the governmental immunity
doctrine does create a possible safe haven for school administrators
and teachers, severing the binding effect of their duty of
reasonable care owed to the students of their schools.
The doctrine of governmental immunity is a confusing one
for our courts to apply. In certain situation it allows the
negligence of school boards, teachers, and administrators to go
unpunished. If the act or omission to act by a teacher or
administrator is deemed to be a discretionary or governmental
function, they are immune from tort liability. This doctrine may
encourage teachers and administrators to take a "wait and see"
approach in protecting children.
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Upon close analysis, the governmental immunity doctrine
does not protect society as it was designed to do. If state
legislatures choose to retain the doctrine, the idea set forth by the
Supreme Court-that of restricting governmental immunity in our
schools-should be more seriously considered.
For, if in the educational environment, we cling to the old
notion that the King can do no wrong, will he not then, for lack of
motivation, fail to do right?
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